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Abstract: Cosmopolitans typically argue that the realization of cosmopolitan ideals 
requires the creation of global political institutions of some kind. While the precise 
nature of the necessary institutions is widely discussed, the problem of the transition to 
such an order has received less attention. In this paper, we address what we take to be a 
crucial aspect of the problem of transition: we argue that it involves a moral 
coordination problem because there are several morally equivalent paths to reform the 
existing order, but suitably placed and properly motivated political agents need to 
converge on a single route for the transition to be successful. It is, however, unclear 
how such a convergence can take place since the duty to create global institutions does 
not single out any coordination point. We draw on the so-called theory of hegemonic 
stability to address this problem and conceptualize what we call the hegemonic 
transition. From an explanatory point of view, we rely on the theory‘s insights to 
explain how a hegemon may contribute to the creation of a rules-based international 
order by providing salient coordination points and accordingly, enabling coordination 
among states. From the normative point of view, we identify necessary conditions for 
the hegemonic transition to be morally permissible. To the extent that these conditions 
obtain, other states have pro tanto moral reasons to follow the salient coordination point 
provided by the leading state.  
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Introduction  
Cosmopolitans usually think that a rules-based international order where global 
institutions set up fair terms of international cooperation among different kinds of 
agents is morally desirable. Recognizing that several pressing issues necessitate global 
cooperation (climate change, migrations, global poverty and inequality), cosmopolitans 
are supportive of broadening and deepening international political integration to tackle 
these issues. Despite generally accepting the need for global institutions, cosmopolitans 
rarely engage with the problem of the transition toward such an arrangement.
1
 This is 
unfortunate because the transition toward a more integrated international order raises 
important normative theoretical problems of its own. Specifically, the problem of 
transition constitutes a moral coordination problem: to create a cosmopolitan 
international order, duty bearers ought to coordinate upon a single point, but it is usually 
not clear what the point should be. In this paper, we aim to elaborate on the nature of 
the transition problem and to offer a possible solution to it.  
In developing our solution, we will use insights from the relevant empirical IR 
literature. The question of how international orders emerge is at the core of IR 
scholarship. In this respect, the theory of hegemonic stability (HST) is of particular 
relevance. In a nutshell, the theory holds that ‗the presence of a single dominant actor in 
international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the 
international system‘ (Snidal, 1985, p. 579). While the theory has been challenged on 
different grounds, we will rely on one part of it that seems the most plausible – the one 
that concerns the emergence of international orders. Following the HST, we will argue 
that a hegemonic state may play a coordinating role in transitioning toward a 
cosmopolitan international order.
2
 We will call this transitional path hegemonic 
3 
 
transition.
3
To the extent that there is a hegemonic state and it performs this 
coordinating role in a satisfactory manner, other states have defeasible but strong pro 
tanto moral reasons to join the coordinating scheme. 
This solution to the problem of transition may strike many cosmopolitans as 
counterintuitive. Since most of them believe that the current, unipolar world order is 
severely unjust, it might seem that the hegemonic state, which has been crucial in 
creating and maintaining the order, is the proper object of moral blame rather than of 
support. Moreover, hegemony involves an extremely unequal distribution of power 
among states that cosmopolitans find morally troubling. Hence, they seem to have 
strong reasons to reject hegemony as a transitional path toward global cosmopolitan 
institutions. In this paper, one of our aims is to make cosmopolitans reconsider these 
reservations. While we do not deny that the current leading state, i.e. the United States 
(and other powerful ones), bears moral responsibility for the unjust features of the 
current order, we argue that this is compatible with it playing a leading role in a 
cosmopolitan transition.
4
We agree that a hegemonic order is incompatible with 
cosmopolitan justice, but we argue that under certain conditions a hegemonic transition 
is a morally permissible way for a cosmopolitan order to be established. We also claim 
that cosmopolitan arguments in favor of the rules-based international order also provide 
reasons in favor of the hegemonic transition as compared to a path that would start from 
scratch, as it were. 
The argument runs as follows. We start by explaining why cosmopolitans 
endorse a rules-based international order and outline the ideal endpoint we call 
theGlobal Political Union. We then compare the current international system, which we 
will refer to as the Liberal World Order with the GPU. Next, we present the problem of 
transition toward the GPU as a moral coordination problem. We then move to resolve 
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this in two steps. First, we argue that there are good reasons to take the LWO as the 
basis for the transitional process to build on. Second, by drawing on the theory of 
hegemonic stability, we explain the role the hegemon can play in creating the 
cosmopolitan order. Based on this, we theorize the notion of hegemonic transition as a 
transition led by a hegemonic state.
5
 We then specify the conditions under which a 
hegemonic transition is morally permissible. To be specific, we do not claim that there 
is no conceivable transition path that could be morally superior to the hegemonic 
transition; we only argue that if and when the hegemon performs its coordinating role 
adequately, other states have pro tanto but defeasible moral reasons to follow its lead. 
In the end, we address some objections to our view.  
 
Cosmopolitanism and Institutional Design  
Cosmopolitanism is the view that the same principles of justice apply to all persons 
globally, just in virtue of their personhood, and regardless of their more specific 
institutional, communal, national or other circumstances (Caney, 2005). This generic 
understanding of cosmopolitanism is a claim about the scope of the principles of justice, 
not about their content. That said, virtually all cosmopolitans agree that at the very least, 
justice requires respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of all persons as 
well as providing some measure of socioeconomic justice globally. For the purposes of 
this paper, it is not necessary to engage in the substantive debates about the correct 
principles of global socioeconomic justice. Instead, we simply assume that some version 
of cosmopolitanism is true. 
Taken in this generic form, cosmopolitanism is not committed to any particular 
view about global institutional design. The usual assumption is that the argument 
regarding global institutional design should proceed instrumentally; once a suitable 
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position on the normative standards for evaluating institutions globally has been 
identified, one can develop a position regarding what institutional scheme would best 
approximate those standards (Pogge, 1992; Caney, 2006). At the extreme, it is 
conceivable that cosmopolitan principles could be satisfied under the current system of 
nation-states if only national political communities and their elected governments 
embraced cosmopolitan views.
6
 Nonetheless, it is unlikely that even an improved 
version of the state system provides the best prospects for achieving cosmopolitan 
goals; virtually all cosmopolitans (and many non-cosmopolitan liberals) agree that 
international or global institutions much more robust than the existing ones are 
necessary for making significant progress towards more just world order.
7
 While some 
argue straightforwardly for world government, others advocate for a global governance 
system in which an increasing number of competences is transferred from the state level 
towards international institutions. Once again, we wish to remain agnostic on the need 
for or desirability of world government. However, we do assume that a form of 
thoroughly institutionalized global political cooperation (consistent with but not 
requiring a world government) provides the best prospects for approximating the 
principles of cosmopolitan justice.
8
 
Our argument incorporates an additional, theoretically inspired feature that 
further restricts the range of institutional arrangements that are likely to pass the 
cosmopolitan test. This feature is the Kantian-inspired claim that justice requires, on 
any scale, the establishment of a single legal system on that scale complete with 
authoritative institutions to make, interpret, and enforce rules. In a nutshell, the Kantian 
insight is that the abstract principles of justice by themselves underdetermine what 
specific conduct individuals must follow in order to secure just outcomes, and therefore 
they also underdetermine the content of law; several different legal arrangements may 
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be equivalent from the point of view of justice.
9
 However, for justice to be secured, it is 
necessary that all individuals concerned converge on the same arrangement out of those 
equivalent from the point of view of justice. This implies that justice requires 
authoritative institutions even among well-motivated individuals because their sense of 
justice alone is not sufficiently action-guiding, and they may disagree about the correct 
principles of justice or about the best way to realize them. Authoritative decision-
making procedures are therefore necessary to pick one (and only one) among the 
arrangements that are equivalent from the point of view of justice. The Kantian insight 
suggests that securing global justice requires, as a necessary condition, the existence of 
authoritative institutions to make rules and enforce them at the global scale.
10
 
To make this description less abstract, it may be productive to think of it along 
the lines of the most developed regional cooperation in modern history, i.e. the 
European Union. To be sure, the EU faces severe challenges these days, but from a 
historical perspective, it is a uniquely successful regime of institutionalized cooperation 
in achieving peace, economic prosperity, and the fulfillment of human rights. The 
institutional order favored by a cosmopolitan ideal of justice might resemble something 
like a much-improved European Union writ large, on a global scale. While we cannot 
spell out the details of such a Union, we believe that the following features are rather 
uncontroversial from a cosmopolitan point of view. The Union would include shared 
sovereignty over highly significant domains of policy-making, and it would have a 
common legal system backed up by judicial institutions complete with enforcement 
mechanisms. Moreover, the Union would, by hypothesis, involve a significant transfer 
union to achieve socioeconomic justice globally. We will refer to this arrangement as 
the Global Political Union (GPU).   
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Cosmopolitans typically focus on identifying principles of justice globally as 
well as on global institutional arrangements that could approximate them. The process 
of transition to such an arrangement, however, has received insufficient attention.
11
We 
will turn to this problem shortly. Before doing so, we would like to clarify the 
connection between the present world order and the cosmopolitan project. The 
clarification is necessary for two reasons. First, a theory of cosmopolitan transition must 
give an account of the normatively significant characteristics of the current international 
order to assess its moral distance from the desired end-state, to see which of its elements 
could potentially serve as building blocks of the latter and which ones are obstacles to 
it. And second, such juxtaposition may be helpful to assess whether the best prospects 
of achieving the end-state are offered by an evolutionary path from the current order, or 
rather by starting from scratch, as it were. To be sure, in one sense the transition 
necessarily takes as its starting point the current order, since this is the ‗here‘ from 
which we morally have to get ‗there‘. Nonetheless, it is a further and open question 
whether the most appealing route is one that builds on the current order or one that 
starts by dismantling it.
12
 We will argue for the first of these alternatives. We provide a 
very brief normative assessment of the current institutional order as compared to the 
sketch of the GPU outlined above. Then, we turn to the problem of transition proper. 
 
The Global Political Union and the “Liberal World Order” 
It has become customary to refer to the post-war international order as the Liberal 
World Order (LWO) (Ikenberry, 2018). While this label invites various 
misunderstandings, several features of the system make it at least partly appropriate. For 
instance, the creation of the United Nations made international peace and cooperation 
the central goals of the international system; human rights have become deeply 
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entrenched as standards to which states are held to account, even if the actual level of 
human rights fulfillment is very far from what liberals (cosmopolitan and non-
cosmopolitan alike) would wish. The LWO has also achieved rule-governed 
cooperation and conflict management in many central areas, most significantly in trade. 
Therefore, even if the LWO may not be an essentially liberal order, it is one with 
significant liberal characteristics and aspirations. As such, it shares some features with 
the arrangement that we have referred to above as the Global Political Union, both at 
the level of normative ideal and of institutional practice.  
However, the LWO is not, nor does it aspire to become, the GPU. For example, 
shared sovereignty and institutionalized cooperation for the purposes of global 
socioeconomic justice is not even among its aspirational goals, let alone an avowed 
shared norm to which political actors could be held account to. The current system takes 
it for granted that sovereign states are the main building blocks of the international 
order and aspires to create peaceful order primarily in interstate relations, and only 
secondarily (if at all) in relations among persons qua persons globally. By contrast, the 
GPU has no commitment to the principle of state sovereignty; instead, it is primarily 
concerned with just relations among all persons. In sum, the two systems share the 
commitment to human rights and rules-based order, while they differ in the way they 
conceive of the goals of such an order and the ultimate standards by which it is to be 
judged.  
Given these differences and similarities with the GPU, how should 
cosmopolitans think of the LWO? Clearly, they cannot be neutral between the LWO 
and its alternatives as commonly understood, i.e. a more ―Westphalian‖ order with 
virtually unconstrained state sovereignty and balance-of-power politics, or some form of 
international anarchy. Cosmopolitans must see the LWO as a significant improvement 
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over these alternatives. But this says nothing about the role it can play in the 
cosmopolitan project. While proponents of the GPU must think that the LWO is 
preferable to its historical alternatives if those are the only options, this need not commit 
them to improve the LWO as the preferred path to the GPU. They may think, for 
instance, that the LWO‘s commitment to the principle of state sovereignty makes it a 
historical cul-de-sac, an improvement as compared to a pure Westphalian system but 
not an appropriate basis for further progress because of the likely path-dependencies 
that an LWO-based transition may create. In short, they may think that the GPU must be 
built from scratch rather than on the back of the LWO. 
We will argue that there are important reasons to build on the LWO and proceed 
by way of gradual reforms. Specifically, any theory of cosmopolitan transition has to 
recognize that the situation in which we contemplate the path to the GPU is not one of 
institutional vacuum, but it is an already highly structured arrangement. This must be 
taken into account not only from the point of view of the costs of different transitional 
paths but also from the point of view of the structures of political agency that are 
available for reform.
13
 A theory of transition has to consider these factors when 
assessing and comparing different transitional paths.
14
In what follows, we will offer 
normative and empirical reasons in support of what we will call ‗hegemonic transition‘. 
We will start by explaining the problem of transition from a normative point of view 
and move to discuss more empirical considerations.  
 
The Problem of Transition 
From the point of view of normative analysis, the problem of transition presents 
theoretical challenges of its own. The crucial challenge is the following. Various agents 
are under moral obligations to take steps towards the realization of the cosmopolitan 
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ideal which we identified as the Global Political Union, but there are multiple (morally 
equivalent) transitional paths that they may pursue.
15
 For a successful transition to the 
GPU to take place, however, all or at least most relevantly placed agents have to adopt 
the same transitional path. In other words, they have to coordinate their actions, but 
their moral obligations do not single out any particular coordination point. Note that this 
holds irrespective of the motivations they might have – coordination problems can 
occur even among well-motivated agents ready to do what they morally ought to do. In 
a nutshell, the problem of cosmopolitan transition can be characterized as a moral 
coordination problem.
16
 It is moral since it concerns the creation of a morally desirable 
cosmopolitan world order, rather than the pursuit of self-interest. These considerations 
reveal the difficulty of reforming the existing order: while global institutions are needed 
to resolve coordination problems among different agents, the creation of such 
institutions triggers coordination problems of its own.  
One might immediately object that the existing international institutions, most 
notably the UN, can provide salient coordination points in transitioning toward the 
GPU.
17
 To be sure, the role of the existing international institutions should not be 
underestimated since they provide important channels of communication and 
consultation among states, and also facilitate their cooperation. This is, however, not 
enough to establish that they can also secure salient coordination points for their own 
reform. Reform proposals and the political momentum to implement them typically 
originate from the states. Despite the existence of several international institutions, 
coordination problems among states are still prevalent and especially pressing in the 
context of global institutional reforms.
18
It follows that the coordination problem that is 
at the heart of the cosmopolitan transition is to be resolved by states themselves. It is in 
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this regard that the IR literature on how international orders emerge and how transitions 
in the order take place becomes relevant. We turn to this now.   
 
 IR and the Creation of International Orders 
The problem of the creation and maintenance of international orders has been the 
subject of intense debates among IR scholars. This fundamental issue in IR theory is 
highly contested, and therefore it is unlikely for a single conclusion to emerge. To the 
extent that our argument relies on an empirical premise drawn from this literature, this 
is a disadvantage since the plausibility of our conclusions will be affected by the 
contested nature of that premise. Nonetheless, we take comfort in the fact that the 
alternative hypotheses are also controversial, and the one that we rely on does not seem 
to be more contested then the alternatives. Since some empirical assumptions are 
necessary, the best we can do is to make assumptions that have significant support 
within the relevant IR literature and that we find convincing, and admit the limitations 
that this imposes on the conclusions that we make. 
Our empirical premise builds on what is sometimes referred to as the ‗theory of 
hegemonic stability‘ (HST). At first approximation, the theory holds, in the useful 
summary of one of its critics, that ‗the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in 
international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the 
international system. Conversely, the absence of a hegemon is associated with the 
disorder in the world system and undesirable outcomes for individual states‘ (Snidal, 
1985, p. 579). The theory is usually seen as making at least two overarching claims: 
first, the hegemony normally facilitates the creation of order, and second, hegemony is 
also necessary for the continuous maintenance of order. The two claims are not 
necessarily interdependent, and not everyone who accepts the first is convinced by the 
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second (Keohane, 2005; Ikenberry, 2018). It is entirely conceivable that once an order 
has been established and its benefits generally enjoyed, the erosion of the hegemony of 
the leading state that had been instrumental in creating it does not undermine its 
successful operation.  
Again, the HST makes claims not simply about how the presence of a hegemon 
affects outcomes within the confines of an international order, but also about the 
emergence of international orders in the first place. Thus, one of the foremost theorists 
associated with the HST, Robert Keohane, has famously argued that the dominant 
economic and military position of the United States in the post-war world (i.e. the 
Western part of it) was a necessary condition of the emergence of the rules-governed, 
significantly institutionalized international order and that the weakening of US 
hegemony is associated with corresponding disturbances within that order (Keohane, 
2005).
19
 A later, distinctively liberal development of the theory further holds that the 
unipolar position of the US, combined with its internal liberal democratic institutions, 
has been responsible for the significant liberal characteristics of the Liberal World 
Order, especially the fact that it includes multilateral institutions that constrain the 
hegemon nearly as much as the less powerful states (Ikenberry, 2012).
20
 This 
refinement of the theory will be of special interest for us, since our normative focus is 
not simply on the creation and maintenance of any kind of order, but of such an order 
that has certain normatively desirable characteristics, including institutionalized 
political cooperation, the rule of law, the entrenchment of human rights, and socio-
economic justice. 
It is noteworthy that we are not committed to the strong claim that hegemony is 
either necessary or sufficient for the creation of a rules-governed multilateral liberal 
order. The first would mean that no such order is possible without a hegemon, while the 
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second would imply that the existence of a hegemon automatically leads to the creation 
of such an order. We do not have great confidence in the first claim, and we have no 
interest in the second. Our premise includes only the more modest claim that the 
existence of a hegemon is normally an important facilitating condition of creating a 
rules-governed multilateral liberal order. 
As stated above, we cannot engage with the vast IR literature on hegemony and 
order. Nevertheless, it is important to briefly describe the key mechanisms that are 
putatively responsible for the link between hegemony and the creation of multilateral 
international institutions. Before doing so, it should be noted that international order 
may come in different varieties, and under different circumstances, the hegemon has 
incentives to forge different types of relations. The two fundamental types of 
international order open to a hegemon are the imperial and liberal ones. Imperial orders 
are characterized by the formal subordination of less powerful states to the hegemon, by 
the fact that they are sustained mainly through coercion or the threat of coercion, and 
the hegemon tends to maximally exploit the power asymmetry between it and the other 
states. ‗Liberal‘ orders are liberal only in the weak sense of mostly operating through 
mutually agreed-upon rules and institutions that bind the hegemonic state as well, that 
they recognize the formal equality of all states, and that they generally favor openness 
of trade and economic activity. 
One question therefore that has preoccupied IR scholars are the circumstances 
that favor the creation of a liberal (aka multilateral order) rather than an imperial one. 
Such a choice may appear puzzling, since by definition the leading state enjoys vast 
bargaining advantages vis-à-vis any other state in bilateral relations, and therefore may 
seem to have an interest in pursuing such putatively exploitative relations. But it is 
entirely possible that a hegemon chooses multilateralism. This choice can be explained 
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by two types of considerations: on the one hand, there are some external considerations 
that are quite independent of the specific characteristics of the leading state; on the other 
hand, certain considerations apply only in the case of hegemons with particular internal 
characteristics.  
Generally, a multilateral order that is created with significant input from the less 
powerful states and whose rules are to some extent negotiated rather than unilaterally 
imposed reduces the costs of enforcement for the leading state. It does not have to rely 
on near-constant coercion or threat thereof and consequently might reduce its military 
expenditure in favor of other socially desirable goals. Second and relatedly, 
multilateralism enhances the perceived and real legitimacy of the order, making it more 
attractive to the less powerful states thus creating incentives for them to join. Third, by 
accepting some limits on its policy autonomy by submission to the common rules, the 
leading state may secure favorable policies from other states at lower costs than would 
be available in an imperial order. These considerations seem to make multilateralism 
attractive to any kind of hegemon regardless of its internal characteristics. 
When it comes to internal considerations, the HST suggests that a hegemon‘s 
internal norms will significantly affect the type of international order it aspires to create.  
If the leading state is internally liberal, there will be normative pressure to adopt similar 
norms internationally as well (see also Doyle, 1983). Second, if the leading state is more 
economically developed than most of its trading partners, then it will have an interest in 
free trade in general, which is easier to achieve through multilateral institutions, since 
even a hegemonic state may not be able to impose such an order on most of the states it 
wants to trade with. Third, the more interdependent the world economy is, the more 
difficult it becomes to settle disputes and harmonize national policies on a case-by-case 
basis, bilateral bargaining or imposition, and the more incentives there will be to create 
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general rules for harmonization, dispute settlement, and conflict management. As the 
volume of policy areas that states need to coordinate upon increases, the more pressing 
the need for robust, rules-based cooperation becomes. Fourth, the leading state may 
anticipate that its economic and technological primacy may not last forever, and other 
states may catch up in the foreseeable future.
21
 The prospect of losing its dominant 
position may provide incentives for the leading state to ‗lock-in‘ favorable terms of 
cooperation by institutionalizing them, thus making them permanent or at least less 
amenable to change even in the period when their advantage will have been eroded 
(Ikenberry, 2012, pp. 102-109). 
As we have repeatedly noted, these claims are far from universally accepted 
among IR scholars. Nonetheless, they do provide a plausible analysis of the emergence 
of the current world order, which cannot be easily dismissed. In any case, our argument 
about the cosmopolitan transition does not require a fully generalizable empirical theory 
about the creation and maintenance of international order. It suffices for our purposes if 
it can be established with some plausibility that the existence of a hegemonic state with 
significant internal liberal-democratic characteristics is a facilitating condition for the 
creation and further transformation of a rules-based, multilateral international order.
22
If 
as much as this is made plausible, then an important factor in considering different 
transition paths to the GPU has been introduced. To wit, the empirical literature 
provides some support for the idea that a transition led by a hegemonic state – a 
hegemonic transition, as we will call it – has somewhat better prospects than its 
alternatives. 
 
Conceptualizing Hegemonic Transition  
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In the previous section, we explained, following some of the basic precepts of the HST, 
how a hegemon can play a crucial role in creating the new international order. We 
called this the hegemonic transition, i.e. the transformation of the LWO led by a 
hegemonic state. With all possible empirical limitations such a hypothesis might face, in 
this section, we will explain how it can address the normative problem of transition that 
we have defined as the problem of moral coordination. Recall that the problem of 
transition essentially concerns the under-determined nature of the transition path that the 
relevantly placed actors face. Given that there is no obvious coordination point, there is 
a risk that agents will pursue different coordinating strategies and consequently, fail to 
coordinate.  
In our view, the hegemonic transition, arguably, can not only solve these 
problems in a practical sense but, under certain conditions, it can do so in a morally 
permissible manner. Under the conditions of hegemonic transition, not all agents are 
symmetrically placed, and therefore not all the otherwise morally equivalent options 
available to them are practically equivalent as well. In particular, the option adopted by 
the hegemonic state provided that it is within the morally eligible set
23
may constitute a 
salient coordination point. In a situation where different (well-motivated) states 
contemplate different transition paths, information about the option adopted by the 
leading state will have special significance, as that option provides the best practical 
prospects of successful coordination. This suggests that when it comes to coordination, 
states may play two distinct roles: providing a salient coordination point for others and 
adopting such a point provided by the hegemonic state. 
When it comes to hegemon, the main idea is that its great capacities entail great 
responsibilities, which in our view, include the following. First, the leading state faces a 
special responsibility to adopt a morally acceptable option because its choice will 
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significantly affect the behavior of other, similarly motivated states. Second, the 
hegemon should pursue, to use Ikenberry‘s term – a rules-based foreign policy and 
conduct international actions through multilateral institutions. In the context of 
transforming the present LWO, this would mean that the hegemon should initiate and 
coordinate changes within the framework of the existing rules-based international order 
instead of trying to make deals with particular countries or impose its choice 
unilaterally. Additionally, the hegemon should employ consultative mechanisms 
allowing other states to participate in creating and implementing integrative agenda. We 
can think of such consultations as an ‗inegalitarian inclusion‘: the hegemon should 
include others in the creation and implementation of the integrative agenda, but such 
inclusion may fall short of equal participation. Importantly, inegalitarian inclusion is 
one of the necessary legitimating conditions of the hegemonic transition, even if it falls 
below the threshold of justice. We will come back to this. Third, the hegemon should 
ensure that there are relations of trust between it and other states, and also among other 
states themselves. Such trust can be built by, for instance, the hegemon following rules 
it helped create, and so assuring others of its benign and cooperative intentions. 
Once the leading state had made its choice in a manner described above, the 
other states have defeasible but strong pro tanto reasons
24
 to adopt the same option even 
if it is not the one that they initially preferred. The coordination option proposed by the 
hegemon is salient because it is more likely that a higher number of states will follow it. 
In this sense, the hegemon‘s choice provides a way out of the coordination problems 
states face and consequently, a way for them to comply with their otherwise 
underdetermined transitional duties.  
One might object that states may still disagree about the coordination point, and 
hence, reject the one proposed by the hegemon, no matter how salient it is. We should 
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here distinguish between two different cases. Some states may reject the proposed 
coordination because they are unwilling to do their share of creating the GPU. 
Alternatively, they may be inclined to reject it because they think there are morally 
better coordination options available. We put the first case aside for now, as we will 
return to the problem of moral motivation later. As for the second case, our view is that 
once the hegemon, after proper consultation and deliberation, has adopted an option that 
is at least within the morally acceptable range, then this is a normally decisive reason 
for other states to adopt the same option, even if they remain convinced that their own 
proposal is morally better. This is so because they have moral reasons to prefer second-
best coordination over no coordination, and adopting the hegemonic option provides the 
best chance of avoiding no coordination.
25
Insisting on their own proposal, by contrast, 
increases the probability of the outcome ranked last from the moral standpoint, i.e. no 
coordination. Therefore, by adopting the hegemon‘s alternative for coordination, the 
other states are likely to better comply with the moral reasons that apply to them 
independently than if they were to try to follow these reasons directly.
26
 
The preceding discussion may convince some readers that a hegemonic 
transition that builds on the existing structures of the LWO should not be ruled out from 
the start as a morally acceptable transition path to the GPU. But does it provide support 
for the case that it could be a morally preferred path over dismantling the LWO and 
starting all over? The question is difficult to assess because of the lack of clarity 
regarding what it takes to start from scratch. It may mean, more modestly, to dismantle 
all existing international institutions and the structure of international law and start 
building a new system that conforms to cosmopolitan principles of justice with the 
participation of states in a fair procedure. More radically, it may mean dismantling the 
existing states as well and building the GPU with the participation of persons directly. 
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The radical proposal is hard to even contemplate, let alone to take seriously. As for the 
more modest one, it seems to us that the considerations adduced above not simply 
support the hegemonic path but also advise against ‗starting over‘. Central to our 
argument is the need for, and difficulty of, achieving coordination in international 
political action even among well-motivated agents and this applies to the alternative 
scenario, too. But while the existing structures of the LWO, however imperfect, provide 
resources for the coordination and for building trust among states, these would be 
sacrificed in the ‗starting over‘ scenario. Furthermore, the creation of such coordination-
enabling structures is a contingent and fragile historic achievement, with no guarantee 
that it can be easily replicated if one starts all over again. For this reason, we take it that 
there are pro tanto reasons that favor the hegemonic transition over the ‗starting from 
scratch‘ alternative. Note that this does not make our proposal conservative since 
gradual reforms can, over time, lead to a global arrangement radically different from the 
current one (i.e. GPU without a hegemon).  
Before we turn to some important objections, let us address an issue that surely 
occurred to some readers by now: the question of the permissibility of the use of force 
by the hegemon to achieve coordination. It seems to us that the primary means for the 
hegemon to discharge its special responsibility to forge the cosmopolitan order is that of 
shaping the options available to others, creating incentives for them to take its preferred 
options, and possibly increasing the costs of not taking them. And if the other states are 
at least partially well-motivated, they will see that they have strong reasons to adopt 
those options for coordination (as long as they are within the morally acceptable set). 
This clearly falls short of full-blown authority in the Razian sense,
27
 in which the 
authority‘s decisions constitute exclusionary reasons for those subject to it, and also 
include the right to use force to ensure compliance. But is this limitation warranted? Is it 
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not the case, by the logic of our argument, that the hegemon‘s privileged position to 
lead the transition, combined with the immense importance of achieving the GPU, 
ground the hegemon‘s full-blown authority including its right to coerce others into 
compliance? 
It seems to us that the general answer is ‗no‘. As far as the issue of building 
more robust and more just global institutions is concerned, the hegemon‘s justified 
influence is limited to incentives. The basic expectation is that enough states will fall in 
line to create a critical mass, and to increase the gravitational pull of the evolving union, 
making it more and more attractive for the still reluctant states to join.
28
 However, we 
do not want to entirely sidestep the question of force. Since the hegemon‘s alleged right 
to force other states to join the GPU is a special case of the more general right to 
enforce cosmopolitan principles, the case of human rights and humanitarian 
interventions may be instructive here. As the norm of human rights has become more 
entrenched within the LWO, the permissibility of humanitarian intervention to stop 
mass violations has also become more widely accepted, at least in principle. It is a 
reasonable expectation that as the GPU continues to evolve and more and more states 
join in, the range of norms around which similar consensus may be formed also 
broadens, and as a result, the scope for the legitimate use of force, either by the 
hegemon supported by other states or by all of them collectively, also expands. Be that 
as it may, it seems to us that the permissibility of the use of force outside gross human 
rights violations is conditional on broad consensus around such norms.
29
 
 
Objections 
The idea that hegemonic transition is a permissible transitional path from the LWO 
towards the GPU will likely attract numerous objections. First, it may be objected that 
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the hegemonic transition allows the most powerful state to skew the cosmopolitan order 
to fit its particular interests. We call this the hijacking objection. Second, one might 
worry that the hegemon would be unwilling to pursue the socio-economic 
transformation of the present world order. We call this the economic inequality 
objection. Third, the hegemonic transition exhibits an extremely unequal distribution of 
power, and this may be incompatible with cosmopolitan egalitarian premises. We will 
call this the unequal distribution of power objection. The first and second objections are 
both related to the moral motivation of the hegemon, so we will discuss them together. 
The third objection raises issues of procedural legitimacy and injustice and therefore 
needs separate treatment. 
 
The Problem of Moral Motivation 
Both the hijacking objection and the economic inequality objection are based on 
accurate observations. The hegemonic state, i.e. the U.S. is clearly enjoying significant 
advantages within the LWO that it will not have once the GPU is established. These 
advantages include having privileged positions in important institutions (U.N., the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank), and in the fact that the LWO does not 
require wealthy nations to share their wealth with others. Therefore, the non-moral 
interests of the U.S. and other high-income countries are in tension with the aspirations 
of the GPU. Why would it lead the charge to create it? 
The objection is grounded in a valid insight. Up until this point, our argument 
simply assumed that political actors (including the hegemon itself) are capable of and 
normally willing to act upon moral reasons. Now it is time to subject this assumption to 
critical scrutiny. One might wonder whether the assumption is even necessary for our 
argument to work; after all, we explained above how the pursuit of enlightened self-
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interest can lead the hegemon to adopt rules-based, liberal multilateral arrangements. 
Can‘t one make a similar argument about the GPU? It seems to us highly unlikely that 
enlightened self-interest alone can take us from the LWO to the GPU; it seems possible 
that it can lead to the establishment of more robust global institutions, but there is no 
strong reason to believe that they would also be more just ones. While in some areas 
(e.g. climate change) self-interest may align with the demands of morality, this seems 
much less likely in other domains, chief among them socioeconomic equality. 
Therefore, moral motivation seems necessary for any conceivable path to the GPU. For 
this reason, we are permitted to assume that agents or at least some of them, are well-
motivated; if we were to give it up, we would be declaring the GPU impossible to 
achieve, and our whole exercise to be pointless. By the same token, the assumption is 
not specific to the hegemonic account of transition; all plausible theories of 
cosmopolitan transition must assume it, too.
30
At the same time, the assumption is not 
fanciful; there is a significant body of evidence suggesting that the international 
behavior of liberal democracies is partially shaped by the normative ideas of their 
domestic politics (Doyle, 1983). 
But this does not settle the issue entirely. One might still worry that our 
motivational assumption is too idealizing. In response, we make three points. First, 
given the partial convergence of enlightened self-interest and moral reasons, it may be 
possible to harness the former in the service of the latter (Ulas, 2016). Second and more 
importantly, we note that our motivational assumption is not as demanding as it may 
first appear. The hegemon need not be motivated directly by full-fledged 
cosmopolitanism in order to make progress towards it. It may be moved by an evolving 
series of intermediate ideals that bridge the normative space between the LWO and the 
GPU. The ideal that motivates it initially could be one that is quite close to the LWO, 
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only to be superseded by another intermediate ideal once the first is reached. And with 
each new intermediary stage, motivations can change too – an agent may be motivated 
to act in specific ways later provided it acts in certain ways first.
31
While non-
cosmopolitan moral reasons may dominate at the beginning of the hegemonic transition; 
as the transition progresses, cosmopolitan moral reasons will become increasingly 
salient. This process can receive further support from the distinctive logic of integrative 
processes – integration in one policy area often necessitates integration in another.32The 
evolution of the EU shows, for instance, how the moral motivation of founding member 
states to secure peace in Europe led them to keep expanding the area of supranational 
integration starting from a very limited economic cooperation in producing coal and 
steel, all the way down to the existing union, and leaving open the further integration 
path. In light of this, it is possible that states, including the hegemon, end up in a world 
order that none of them aimed for at the beginning of the process. Third, it is not 
necessary to assume that all the relevant actors are well-motivated; it may be sufficient 
if the hegemon and some other key states are.
33
In sum, it seems to us that our 
motivational assumption is both necessary and more empirically plausible than may first 
appear. 
The Unequal Distribution of Power Objection 
Another, related objection concerns the process of hegemonic transition itself, rather 
than its likelihood of reaching an acceptable outcome. It is a natural suggestion that the 
egalitarian commitments of cosmopolitanism should be reflected in the transition 
process as well, which is clearly not the case with the hegemonic transition. The 
problem of epistemic injustice is especially pressing. In response, we would like to 
make two points. First, the focus of the egalitarian commitment of cosmopolitanism are 
individuals, not states. It is the equal opportunity for the political power of individuals 
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that can be plausibly associated with cosmopolitanism and such equality is in principle 
compatible with the unequal distribution of power among states. It may be in line with 
egalitarian commitments that more populous states that represent more people should 
have more influence on the shape of the global order.
34
 Therefore, the fact that the 
hegemon, which in all conceivable scenarios is a large and populous state, has an 
unequal role in the transition is not necessarily damning from a cosmopolitan 
standpoint. 
However, this response goes only so far. There are very large states with huge 
populations that are quite poor by the standards of advanced economies, and which have 
disproportionately little influence in international politics due to various historical 
circumstances, including colonialism.
35
 Such disparities cannot be justified on the same 
grounds as the disparity between the United States and, say, Belgium may be accounted 
for. Therefore, it has to be granted that some aspects of the unequal power of the 
hegemon in the transition is morally suspect. This brings us to our second point: all 
inequalities of political power stand in need of justification, and at least part of the 
justification will be instrumental in character. That is, the inequality of power is 
justified, at least partly, if it is necessary to achieve morally better political outcomes, or 
if it at least significantly increases the probability of these outcomes.
36
If our empirical 
assumption that the hegemonic path increases the likelihood of success in creating a 
cosmopolitan order, then one crucial piece of the justification of the hegemon‘s unequal 
position is established. 
One might object here that a path involving an arrangement like the League of 
Democracies represents a more inclusive and democratic alternative to the hegemonic 
path (Pasternak, 2012). And if such an alternative is, in fact, feasible, then that weakens 
the moral case for the hegemonic path. In response, we do not think of the League as a 
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sui generis alternative to the hegemonic transition since it would require a leading state 
to facilitate the creation of the League in the first place. Hence, instead of being its 
alternative, it is instructive to think of the League as one of the possible stages within 
the hegemonic transition. 
Now, we are not claiming that the probability of achieving the desired outcome 
is normally sufficient to justify a transition path or that ‘outcome trumps procedure‘. 
This is why we emphasize that the hegemonic transition ought to be as consultative and 
multilateral as possible, and oriented towards building trust among the agents involved. 
However, it should be noted that the cosmopolitan transition is a non-standard case 
insofar that the core of the problem is precisely that there is no established institutional 
procedure for building cosmopolitan institutions. Therefore, well-motivated agents will 
often face a choice between making progress towards the GPU in ways that are not 
sanctioned by formal legitimate procedures, and not making any progress at all. It is in 
this specific setting that we propose the acceptability of the hegemonic path.
37
We also 
note that under such conditions, inegalitarian inclusion can serve as one of the 
legitimating conditions of the hegemonic transition. This legitimating condition is 
admittedly weak, and the path to a substantively just arrangement inevitably leads 
through procedural injustice. It is the responsibility of the hegemon to mitigate this as 
much as possible, and perhaps of the GPU, once it is established, to compensate for it. 
However, we recognize that even with ex-post compensation, there is something 
genuinely morally regrettable about the procedural injustice of hegemonic transition 
that is not fully remedied by the expected outcome. 
We add a final qualification. It seems to us that as the hegemonic transition 
progresses and the world order moves closer to the cosmopolitan ideal, the demands of 
procedural legitimacy and justice become gradually more stringent. The progressive 
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institutionalization of cosmopolitan norms makes the egalitarian inclusion of all states 
increasingly feasible and therefore normatively required. 
Our claim about the inevitable procedural injustice of the transition bears some 
resemblance to Thomas Nagel‘s speculation that ‘the most likely path toward some 
version of global justice is through the creation of patently unjust and illegitimate global 
structures of power that are tolerable to the interests of the most powerful current 
nation-states‘ (Nagel, 2005:146). However, there is a crucial difference. In Nagel‘s 
view, the existence of a global state is a precondition of the demands of global justice to 
apply, and states have no justice-based reasons to create one (Nagel, 2005, p.133).
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By 
contrast, our view is that principles of justice apply globally, and this constitutes a 
reason for agents to create the institutions that are necessary to live up to their demands. 
Our claim about the inevitability of injustice concerns the process of transition only.
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We would like to emphasize that our argument suggests only that other states 
have strong pro tanto moral reasons to support the hegemon in discharging its 
coordinating role, not that they are morally obligated to do so. But it is precisely this 
weaker claim that we have been seeking to vindicate. We add, though, that the more the 
leading state complies with the desiderata of consultation and multilateral decision-
making mentioned above, the stronger the reasons for supporting it become. Moreover, 
as the hegemonic transition gradually takes its place and consequently, global 
institutions and rules slowly emerge, state power, including the power of the hegemon, 
will be more and more constrained perhaps up until the point when the state system as 
such will be transcended. Returning to our major point, a salient coordination point 
necessary to resolve coordination problems triggered by the global institutional reforms 
can be provided by the hegemon. To the extent such salient option meets the conditions 
of moral permissibility defined earlier, and thus determines states‘ transitional duties; 
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the determination of duties has a greater moral weight than the problem of unequal 
distribution of power among states, at least in the transitional period.  
 
Conclusion  
To the extent that our characterization of the normative problem of transition and our 
interpretation of the HST‘s empirical analysis are sound, it seems that cosmopolitans 
can endorse the present liberal world order as the starting point to be built on toward a 
world order compatible with cosmopolitan principles of justice. Moreover, they can also 
endorse what we called the hegemonic transition to the extent it complies with our 
criteria of moral permissibility and as such resolves the problem of moral coordination. 
The discussion aimed to show that if the empirical conditions obtain, the solution to the 
problem of transition is available. In the end, we would like to note that our argument 
has a limited scope. We do not claim that other solutions are inconceivable. We only 
hold that the hegemonic transition is a morally eligible option and that it has the 
advantage of being grounded in sufficient empirical evidence. Its potential alternatives 
should be similarly empirically grounded for a comparative moral evaluation to be 
possible. 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
For rare philosophical discussions that explicitly engage with the problem of transition 
see Buchanan (2007), Gilabert (2012), Valentini (2017). Further works that address 
various aspects of the cosmopolitan transition relevant for our argument include 
Pasternak (2012), Ulaş (2016, 2017). 
2
 Throughout the paper we will use the terms a ‗hegemonic state‘ and a ‗leading state‘ 
interchangeably. 
3
 We use the generic term ‗cosmopolitan transition‘ as transitioning toward a 
cosmopolitan world order, and the term ‗hegemonic transition‘ as a specific kind of 
cosmopolitan transition. 
4
 While our argument is an abstract one about the possible role of the hegemonic state 
(to the extent there is one), it can be plausibly construed as relevant for assessing the 
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situation of the United States, which is widely understood to be the current hegemon. 
See Keohane (2005), and especially Ikenberry (2012). We are grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point.  
5
 Note that our usage of the term ‗hegemonic transition‘ differs from the one employed 
in the IR literature where it stands for transitioning from a world order led by one 
hegemon, to an order led by another one. See, for instance,  Kupchan (2014). On our 
account, hegemonic transition is about transitioning toward a cosmopolitan, non-
hegemonic world order.  
6
 For a version of such view see Ypi‘s account of statist cosmopolitanism in Ypi (2011); 
Cf. Ulaş (2017) 
7
 For cosmopolitan accounts see, for instance,  Beitz (1979),  Caney (2005), Pogge 
(2008), Gilabert (2012); For non-cosmopolitan accounts see, for instance, Ronzoni 
(2013)  
8
 For institutional proposals of varying degrees of specificity, see for instance,Held 
(1995),Archibugi (2008), Marchetti (2012).Of these, Marchetti‘s federalist approach 
is the closest to our own. 
9
 We say Kantian rather than Kant‘s since Kant himself was unclear about the favoured 
kind of global cooperation. For instance, in the Perpetual Peace he endorsed a 
peaceful voluntary association (―foedus pacificum‖) among states. See Kant (1999). 
However, many scholars interpret Kant's cosmopolitan thought as supporting more 
robust forms of global cooperation. For arguments along these lines see Byrd and 
Hruschka (2008), Pogge (1988). 
10
 One of the advantages of the Kantian account of global justice is that it can explain 
why global institutions have to be authoritative. For an illuminating discussion see 
Varden (2011). 
11
 However, see the works mentioned in fn 1.  
12
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us to clarify the problem of the 
‘starting point‘. 
13
 In a similar vein, Buchanan defends what he calls ‗progressive conservativism‘ 
according to which global transformations should start from the most morally 
acceptable principles of the existing international law. In Buchanan (2007, p. 63); 
Valentini makes a similar, although less elaborated point in Valentini (2011). 
14
 For an account of cosmopolitan transition that takes this consideration seriously, see 
Pasternak (2012). Pasternak‘s account is congenial to our own to the extent that it 
also sees states (and democratic states in particular) as the key agents of the 
transition. Our account is distinguished by focusing on the potentially privileged role 
of specific states in light of their superior power and position in the current order. 
15
We take for granted that states bear a moral obligation to create just global institutions 
and we are predominantly concerned with how they can discharge their obligations.  
16
 For the term, see Garthoff (2010). 
17
 For such a proposal see for instance, Archibugi (2008, p. 156). 
18
 For the discussion of the inability of the present international order to adapt to 
changes and self-reform see Snidal (1985). 
19
 It should be noted that Keohane is ambivalent about the hegemonic stability theory, 
especially regarding its crude realist version that focuses entirely on material 
capabilities. His refined version incorporates the significance of political ideas and 
attitudes, and internal political structures. See Keohane (2005, pp. 31-35). 
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20
Ikenberry acknowledges that the US has not sought to build multilateral institutions 
everywhere. Instead, it pursued bilateral interactions in Asia, and it has been entirely 
willing to unilaterally dominate in Latin America and the Middle East. Initially at 
least, its multilateralism was restricted to its dealings with Western Europe, where it 
was instrumental in the creation of what later became the European Union. See 
Ikenberry (2012, p. 82). 
21
 As it happened, for instance, in the case of Western Europe and Japan once they were 
rebuilt after the destruction of the world wars. 
22
One might point to cases where the hegemon was not necessary for the creation of 
international institutions. A paradigmatic example is the creation of the International 
Criminal Court, which not only was created without the hegemon, but the hegemon 
even sabotaged its creation. But our point is only that hegemonic coordination is a 
facilitating condition of creating international order, not that it is a necessary one. 
Surely, the creation of the ICC could have been smoother if the U.S. had been a more 
willing participant. 
23
 I.e. it is among the morally equivalent or at least acceptable alternatives. For an 
analysis of these types of situations, see Gaus (2012). 
24
 If a more egalitarian path were to be suddenly feasible, that could constitute a 
defeating condition, for example. 
25
 For an analogous argument in the context of democratic legitimacy, see Waldron 
(1999, pp. 101-106). 
26
 This formulation is deliberately echoing Joseph Raz‘s ‘normal justification thesis‘. 
See Raz (1988, p. 53). The hegemon‘s superior ability to bring about coordination 
resembles the characteristics of an authority: the fact that the hegemon adopted a 
morally acceptable alternative itself gives a reason for others to adopt the same, over 
and above the independent merits of this alternative. 
27
 Although it significantly goes beyond merely leading by example or being a moral 
lighthouse. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point. 
28
 As an illustration, we can think of the EU‘s gravitational pull and the neighbouring 
countries‘ unqualified desire to join.  
29
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to clarify our position on 
coercion. 
30
 Luke Ulaş makes the same point in ―Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World 
Government,‖ at p. 106. 
31
Jensen refers to this phenomenon as ‘indirect diachronic ability‘ in Jensen (2009). 
32
This is argued by the proponents of the functional theory of integration. For a seminal 
work see Mitrany (1948). 
33
 This point was suggested to us by one of the referees for this journal. 
34
 It is in principle unobjectionable that in federal structures more populous subnational 
units wield larger political influence. 
35
 The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the poorer states often suffered 
colonial oppression. While this significantly complicates the moral case for 
hegemonic transition, it is important to note that rectifying past injustice is typically 
included in cosmopolitan projects, and therefore we assume that it is addressed in the 
GPU. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
36
This is a crucial component of standard justifications of the political authority of the 
state. See for instance Raz‘s ‘service conception‘ of authority, (1988, p. 67). 
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37
 It seems to us that the same considerations apply to a related objection that raises the 
problem of epistemic injustice that would result from the hegemonic transition, as 
compared to a process that is more inclusive of a diversity of cultural perspectives. 
Once again, this strikes us as an important worry that calls for self-restraint on the 
part of the hegemon as well as making the process as consultative as is consistent 
with making significant progress. We are grateful for an anonymous reviewer for 
raising this and related issues. 
38
They may have non-justice-based reasons to do so. 
39
We thank two anonymous reviewers for pressing us to clarify the relevance of Nagel‘s 
point for our account. 
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